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SUMMARY 
The System Status Display Study is part of the Advanced Transport Operating Systems Program spon- 
sored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Langley Research Center and is directed 
toward the development of advanced display information for the flight deck operations of future com- 
mercial aircraft. The system status display (SSD) is an electronic display system which provides the crew 
with an enhanced capability for monitoring and managing the aircraft systems and which may be used in 
a standalone mode or in conjunction with automated system control. The benefits of this system include 
improving the crew’s interaction with the aircraft systems, improving the reliability of crew and system 
operations, and ensuring efficient use of flight deck workspace. 
This report presents the results of the second part of the study. The objective was to evaluate alternative 
design concepts developed in the first part. The evaluation was by flight simulation in a fixed-base flight 
deck simulator. Design issues included: 
1. Display Format - Should the status information be presented in a pictorial format or alpha- 
numeric text? 
System Control - Are multifunction controls collocated with system status information better 
than dedicated controls separated spatially from status information? 
Procedural Information - Does the integration of procedural information with system status infor- 
mation improve crew performance over the use of paper checklist with the status information? 
2. 
3.  
The SSD consisted of computers, a color CRT, a display control panel, system interfaces with the 
systems, and either dedicated or multifunction control panels. The SSD was used in conjunction with a 
master caution and warning system based upon the guidelines proposed by the Alerting Systems 
Standardization Study. 1 The simulation implemented models of the SSD, alert, fuel, and hydraulic 
systems as well as the aerodynamics and equations of motion of a large-body transport aircraft, 
Twelve pilots with extensive commercial jet transport experience participated in the study. The simula- 
tion trials were conducted with a single pilot per trial. The other pilot was assumed to be incapacitated to 
simulate a high workload. While the pilot manually flew an approach pattern, system malfunctions 
caused alerts. The pilot was required to respond to the alert by reconfiguring the system. 
Performance measurements consisted of (1 )  the time required to acknowledge the alert, (2) the time 
required to complete the abnormal procedures, (3) the number of discrete steps to complete the proce- 
dures, and (4) the number of errors committed. Flight performance and the amount of flight control 
activity were measured to  determine the effect of the experimental conditions on the primary flight task. 
A modified Cooper-Harper rating scale was used to measure subjective workload. 
With pictorial displays, significantly less time was required to complete the abnormal procedures, and 
there was a lower workload score. It was concluded that pictorial displays are superior to text for the 
presentation of system status information. The multifunction control interfaces collocated with the 
status information had shorter completion times and lower workload scores than the dedicated 
overhead panel. It was concluded that the collocation of the controls with the status information was the 
primary reason. 
The interactive procedure information had shorter completion times, less discrete steps, and fewer 
errors than the paper checklists. One drawback to the use of interactive procedures was that the pilots 
tended to react only to the procedures without full comprehension of the problem or  the consequences 
of their actions. The experimental conditions had little impact upon the primary flight activity. 
t 
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IN T HOD U CTIO N 
A review of the cognitive literature implies that pictures are better than words for aircraft systems’ 
displays. Pictures are recognized faster than words, but i t  takes longer to name pictures than words.6 
This may be due to the memory coding of pictures and words. Pavio7.8proposed that pictures are stored 
in direct memory which has a close relationship to the sensory experience that created the image. Words 
are stored in phonemes (speech utterances) or the visual representation of phonemes. Communication 
or comparison of pictures or a sensory experience to words is by way of the short-term working memory. 
Another factor is the retention of an aircraft system in long-term memory. Chase9 suggests that the 
memory of a system is an abstraction of the spatial and the functional relationships of objects to one 
another. Egam and Schwartzloin their study of circuit diagrams concluded that experts recall patterns 
based on their conceptual knowledge of a circuit’s function. These studies suggest that the crew reten- 
tion of an aircraft system in long-term memory would be similar to the functional schematic. They fur- 
ther suggest that less mental steps are required to  extract information from a pictorial schematic than 
from a word listing. 
t 
~ 
1 
BACKGHOL‘ND 
Current transport aircraft use multifunction color CRTs to display engine and aircraft status informa- 
tion. The first study2 identified principles and guidelines to be used in the design of display formats for 
the management and control of aircraft systems. A system engineering approach was used to identify 
and classify information requirements for various aircraft systems according to flight phase. This 
approach permitted the identification of information based upon the crew’s requirements for decision 
making and performing actions. The information was partitioned into four distinct classes: (1) identi- 
fiers, (2) descriptors, (3) status, and (4) instructions. This classification helps identify information 
sources and the grouping of that information. 
I Another issue for the SSD concept is the control interface with the aircraft systems. Are multifunctional 
controls acceptable or should dedicated controls be retained? I f  dedicated controls are used, they must 
be separated from the multifunction display. In transport aircraft, the only reasonable location for dedi- 
cated controls is in the overhead panel, and the only reasonable location for the SSD is in the center 
instrument panel. Multifunction controls, (e.g., line select keys or touch panels) can be collocated with 
the SSD. This confounds the issue; if multifunction controls are used, they can be collocated with the 
SSD while dedicated controls must be separated spatially. 
One issue that remained was the display format. Should the display format be pictorial or alphanumeric 
text? Several studies have developed pictorial schematics for aircraft systems’ displays.2J.dJ These 
studies were of conceptual designs and none was concerned with comparative evaluations of other con- 
cepts or current displays. The first operational transport aircraft to use pictorial schematics and 
checklists on CRTs for the aircraft systems is Airbus Industries’ A310. These aircraft are in active use 
which proves the concepts are feasible. However, it remains to be shown that pictorial schematics are 
improvements over other display concepts, including alphanumeric text. . 
1 
causes a parallax problem, the requirement for feedback other than tactile, the smudging of the display 
surface, and vibration caused by normal aircraft operation. 
b 
Another potential control interface is voice-activated controls. The primary advantage of voice control 
is that i t  does not require hand coordination and movement. I t  requires speech utterances so that the 
same problems with alphanumeric text will occur with voice control. Other problems are recognition 
reliability and transmission time. l 2  Because of these drawbacks, voice control was not considered in this 
study. 
- 
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A separate issue involved with aircraft systems control is automation. With the new-generation flight 
decks such as those on the Airbus A320 and the MD-11, on-line monitoring and reconfiguration are 
beingautomated. This eliminates the need for the crew to monitor and control the systems; the crew only 
provides a backup when the automated system fails. This has raised concerns about flight safety; e.g., 
the ability of the crew to recognize and respond to failures of the automatic system and also, how the 
crew can maintain its skill level to provide this manual backup. 13,  ’“he issues include what information 
should be provided for crew monitoring of the automated functions and how information should be 
provided for manual backup. 
b 
SYSTEM STATUS DISPLAY CONCEPT 
A system status display (SSD) was developed3 to evaluate these issues in a simulation study. The SSD 
consisted of computers, color CRT displays, display control panels, I/O interfaces with the aircraft 
systems, and control interfaces for systems control. A block diagram of the system is shown in Figure 1.  
SSD \ \  
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Each aircraft system may have its own independent control units that provide fault monitoring, detec- 
tion, and correction. The prioritization and display of alerts were provided by a master caution ar,d 
warning (MCW) system. The MCW consisted of redundant computers, the MCW annunciators, aural 
tones, and the alert display. The MCW was designed according to the guidelines set forth by th FAA 
Alerting Systems Standardization Study. 
I 
The SSD computer generates status display formats, stores and presents procedures, monitors crew 
actions, and prompts the crew. The system provides the crew with feedback on the results of its actions 
and annunciates changes in aircraft status and operating characteristics. The SSD provided information 
for operation of the aircraft systems both when the primary mode of operation was manual or when 
manual operation was the backup to automated system control. 
Using the SSD, the following issues were addressed: 
1 1. Display Format - Should the aircraft status information be presented in pictorial schematics or 
alphanumeric text? 
System Control - Are multifunction controls with system status information better than 
dedicated controls separated spatially from status information? 
mation improve crew performance over the use of paper checklist with the status information? 
2. 
I 3. Procedure Information - Does the integration of procedural information with system status infor- 
1 
I 
The objective of this study was to use the SSD on a fixed-base simulator to resolve these issues. Both 
objective performance measures and pilot opinion were used to evaluate the results. 
I 
i 
1 
3 
METHOD 
s)RIam PAGE 1s 
OR POOR QUALITY PILOTS 
Twelve pilots from Douglas Aircraft Company's Flight Operations department participated in this 
study. These pilots averaged 6,800 hours in commercial jet transport aircraft and all but one had more 
than 500 hours in DC-IO aircraft. The balance of their flight time was in DC-8, DC-9, MD-80,727, C-5A 
and C-130 aircraft. The pilots' mean age was 57 years, their median age was 58, and their ages ranged 
from 33 to 67. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A full factorial repeated-measures design was used for the two display formats, the three control inter- 
faces, and the two procedural presentations. The pilots were divided into two groups. One group 
received the interactive procedures in the first block of trials and the paper checklist in the second block. 
The other group received the opposite. The display formats and the control interfaces were counter- 
balanced within the block of trials so that each pilot received a unique sequence of conditions. There 
were two trials for each of the experimental conditions. Within each trial, three non-normal events 
occurred. These events prompted advisory, caution, and warning alerts requiring the pilot response 
while flying the aircraft. 
SIMULATOR 
A fixed-base cockpit simulator, shown in Figure 2, was used for the evaluation. This is a modified DC-10 
cockpit with computer-driven displays, a programmable McFadden center-stick controller, rudder 
A 
FIGURE 2. FIXED BASE COCKPIT SIMULATOR. 
pedals, a throttle quadrant, slatlflap controls, and a landing gear handle. The primary flight instru- 
ments are electromechanical. Two 8-inch color CRT displays were mounted in the center instrument 
panel for the SSD, the engine, and the alert displays. The aircraft and system models are provided by a 
DEC VAX 8600 computer. The VAX 8600 was linked to a satellite computer that serves as an input/out- 
put interface to the controls, the instruments, and the visual terrain model. The SSD model and displays 
are provided by the VAX 8600 linked to a Vector General graphics system that drives the two Xytron 
CRT displays. The graphic system is a calligraphic or stroke written system. 
The simulation consists of several models which interact with each other as shown in Figure 3. The 
equations of motion, the aerodynamics, the controls, and the engine models are based on a two-engine 
DC-10. The fuel and hydraulic system models are simplified operating models that provide system status 
information for the SSD and inputs for the engine and control models. 
The fuel model supplies manifold pressure for the engines and the consumption of fuel depends on their 
thrust settings. Loss of fuel pressure would produce a caution alert but would not cause the engine to 
flame out. The hydraulic model supplies manifold pressure for the hydraulic actuators on the control 
surfaces. The loss of hydraulic pressure in one of the manifolds results in the loss of the actuators sup- 
plied by the manifold which may affect the controllability of the aircraft. The state of the fuel and 
hydraulic systems depend upon the switch settings and system malfunctions introduced as part of the 
event scenario. Descriptions of these systems are contained in Appendix A. 
STATUS DISPLAY SYSTEM 
The SSD is the left CRT display in the center instrument panel (Figure 2). It has multiple pages which 
contain phase-of-flight and system-status information. The selection of the pages depends on the phase 
of flight, an alert, or pages can be manually selected via the SSD control panel located in the pedestal. 
The information on the pages depends on the status of the systems. The page formats include phase-of- 
flight pages and system pages. The system pages consist of formats with varying levels of detail. 
The SSD control panel, shown in Figure 4, is located on the left side of the pedestal aft of the throttle 
quadrant. This panel consists of backlighted pushbutton switches. The crew can select either the phase- 
of-flight, the fuel, the hydraulic, or the flight control surface pages. Page advance and backpage swit- 
ches are provided to select the alternate pages within a system. 
MASTER CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM 
The alerting system uses the guidelines developed by the FAA Alerting System Standardization Study. * 
I t  consists of a MCW annunciator on the glareshield, aural tones, and an alert display that occupies the 
left portion of the right CRT in the center instrument panel. The alert display contains text annuncia- 
tions of the alerts in their associated color (warning - red, caution - amber, and advisory - cyan) and 
ordered according to alert level. The alerts are ordered chronologically within an alert level with the most 
recent at the top of the list. The syntax is the system name, the specific subsystem, and the nature of the 
problem. The sequence of events depends on the alert level as follows: 
Warning 
When a warning occurs, the master warning annunciator on the glareshield turns on and the warning 
tone sounds. The warning tone is a n  alternating high- and low-frequency tone lasting one second and 
sounds every three seconds until the pilot cancels it with the annunciator switch. A red alert message 
appears on the alert display and remains for the duration of the problem. The associated system page 
appears on the SSD until the problem is resolved or the pilot manually selects another page. 
6 
0 w 
7 
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S 
I D  I 
~~ 
FIGURE 4. SSD CONTROL PANEL LOCATED IN CENTER PEDESTAL. 
Caution 
When a caution occurs, the master caution annunciator on the glareshield turns on, and a steady tone 
that lasts for one second sounds; the tone is repeated every 10 seconds until the pilot cancels i t  with the 
annunciator switch. An amber alert message appears below any warnings on the alert display which 
remains displayed until the problem is corrected. The system page associated with the alert is displayed 
until the problem is resolved or the pilot manually selects another page. 
Advisoo 
When an advisory occurs, a single tone sounds which is similar to a chime and a cyan alert message 
appears on the alert display below the caution messages. The existing system page remains on the SSD 
until the crew selects the appropriate page. 
EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES 
The issues enumerated in the INTRODUCTION were the display format, the system control interface, 
and the presentation of procedural information. The following variables were selected for the evalua- 
tion. 
System Display Format 
Two format conditions were selected: (1) pictorial, and (2) alphanumeric text. Examples of these for- 
mats are shown in Figures 5 and 6 for the hydraulic system. The formats for the fuel, hydraulic, and con- 
trol surfaces are presented in Appendix B. The following general rules were used to develop these for- 
mats. 
Pictorial - The overall structure of the display is a schematic of the system and is representative of the 
physical orientation in the aircraft and the functional relationship of the systems and their elements. 
Pictographs are used for the components and parallel lines connecting the pictograph elements are mani- 
folds. The f i l l  between these lines represents the operational state of the system. I f  empty, the system is 
of f ;  i f  filled green, the system is operating normally; and i f  filled in an alert-level color, the system is non- 
normal. Alphanumerics are used as labels. Quantitative information is shown by analog scales as well as 
numerics. 
HYD 
1 2 3 
37°C 8GAL 37°C 0GAL 37°C 8 GAL 
FIGURE 5. PICTORIAL SCHEMATIC OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS PAGE 
H Y D  
Q U A N T I T Y  O U A N T I T Y  Q U A N T I T Y  
8 G A  8 G A  8 G A  
T E M P  T E M P  T E M P  
3 7  c 37 c 37 c 
P R E S S U R E  P R E S S U R E  P R E S S U R E  
3 0 0 0  P S I  3 0 0 0  P S I  3 0 0 0  PSI 
E l  P U M P  E l  P U M P  E 2  P U M P  
ON A R M E D  ON 
A U X  P U M P  E 2  P U M P  A U X  P U M P  
O F F  ON OFF 
M T R  P U M P  R A T  
A R M E D  OFF 
FIGURE 6. ALPHANUMERIC TEXT OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS PAGE 
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Alphanumeric Text - The names of the system components are used to identify them. As in the pic- 
torial schematic, the names are grouped according to their physical orientation as well as the functional 
relationships. 
Adverbial phrases are used to describe the status of a system component. The color of the adverbial 
phrase indicates whether it is off (grey), operating normally (green), or is in an abnormal state (red, 
amber or cyan). Numerics are used to show quantitative information. 
System Control 
Three methods of controlling the fuel and hydraulic systems were provided: a dedicated overhead panel, 
a touch panel overlay on the SSD, and line select keys mounted on the SSD bezel. 
Dedicated Overhead Panel - The overhead panel consists of a backlighted panel with split-legend push- 
button switches. The switches are laid out in a schematic diagram with flow lines representative of mani- 
folds connecting the switches. A diagram of the overhead panel is shown in Figure 7. The switch shows a 
lighted f low line if i t  is operating normally, unlighted if i t  is off, and an annunciation if i t  is in a non- 
normal state. Also, low system pressure annunciations are provided. 
HYD 
AUX E N G l  E N G l  ENG2 ENG2 AUX RAT 
1-3 MTR 
FUEL 
E TANK 1 
XFEED 
[Low] 
3- AUX TANK 5 TANK 2 
XFEED 
FIGURE 7. DEDICATED OVERHEAD PANEL FOR FUEL AND HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS. 
Line Select Keys - The bezel-mounted keys consist of illuminated pushbutton switches. Dashed lines 
are provided on the SSD to show which key is associated with what component on thestatus display. Fig- 
ure 8 shows an example of the line select keys with the fuel schematic. Feedback is provided by tactile 
means and by a change in component status on the SSD. 
I IYD 
El 
El 
El 
El 
FIGURE 8. LINE SELECT KEYS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FUEL DISPLAY. 
Touch Panel - A membrane touch panel manufactured by Elographics, Inc. was mounted over the 
SSD. The virtual area of the switch was a half-inch square centered over the component symbol or alpha- 
numeric text. Feedback was provided by a half-second tone and a change in component status on the 
SSD. 
Procedure Information 
The procedure information consisted of the identification of the component to be changed and the 
action to be taken. Two methods of presenting this information were evaluated: (1) interactive pro- 
cedures on the SSD, and (2) the use of a paper checklist. 
Interactive Procedures - The procedure format depended upon the display format. If the SSD format 
was pictorial, the adverb associated with the action and an arrow pointing to  the component was 
displayed on the SSD. If there were more than one action required, a list of actions would appear on the 
left side of the display. For the alphanumeric text, the component name and the action adverb were listed 
at the top of the display. These two presentations are illustrated in Figure 9. The color of the procedures 
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1-3 HYD SYS PRES 3 HYD QUANTITY 
ON 1 HYD ENG 1 
OFF I I 
H Y D  1 - 3  H Y D  S Y S  P R E S  3 H Y D  O U A N T I T Y  
1 H Y D  ENG 1 
ON 1 H Y D  P . U X . .  . . . 
3 H Y D  E N G  2 . .  . . . O F F  
1 - 3  M O T O R  PUMP . . . . .  O F F  
1 H Y D  E N G  I . . . . .  O F F  
O U A N T I T Y  O U A N T I T Y  O U A N T I T Y  
8 G A  8 G A  0 G A  
T E M P  TEMP T E M P  
3 7  c 37 c 3 7  c 
P R E S S U R E  P R E S S U R E  P R E S S U R E  
0 P S I  3 0 0 0  P S I  0 P S I  
E l  PUMP E l  PUMP E 2  PUMP 
ON ARMED O N  
AUX PUMP AUX P U M P  E 2  PUMP 
O F F  ON O F F  
MTR P U M P  R A T  
ARMED OFF 
FIGURE 9. INTERACTIVE PROCEDURES FOR THE PICTORIAL AND TEXT DISPLAYS. 
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is magenta and the current procedure is brighter than the remainder. If  the crew member performs the 
procedure, i t  is deleted from the display. If the fault is not corrected or an incorrect action occurs, new 
procedures appear depending upon the system state. 
Paper Checklist - The other method was a paper checklist equivalent to the abnormal checklist used in 
current commercial transports or the quick reference handbook. An example of the checklist is shown in 
Figure 10. The entire checklist used in this study is presented in Appendix C. For each fault there is a list 
of procedures where the components and the action adverbs are listed. The checklist has decision 
branches where the crew must determine the state of the system or aircraft before deciding which branch 
to take. 
Procedure 
The pilots were scheduled for three 3-hour sessions. The first session was the briefing and a practice ses- 
sion and the remaining two were data sessions. The experimenter read the briefing to the pilot and 
answered any questions. The pilot briefing is presented in Appendix D. After completing the briefing, 
the pilot was given six practice trials, one on each of the display format/control interface combinations 
for the first procedure presentation condition. The experimenter assisted the pilot in performing the sys- 
tem functions to accelerate the pilot’s learning. In the second session, the pilot was given two trials on 
each of the six conditions for the first procedure presentation condition. In the third, he received two 
trials on each of the six conditions for the second procedure presentation condition. After completing all 
three sessions, the pilots filled out the questionnaire that is contained in Appendix E. 
FUEL SYSTEM PRESSURE LOW (C) 
FORWARDPUMP .................................. 
IF PRESSURE REMAINS LOW 
1 & 2 XFEED ........................................... 
1&2XFER .............................................. 
FUEL OUANTITY ................................... 
FUEL CONFIGURATION (A) 
IF FUEL IN AUXILIARY TANK, 
AUXILIARY PUMP ................................. 
LOTK XFERVALVE ............................... 
Hi TK XFER VALVE ..................... 
WHEN BALANCED. 
~ I T K X F E R ~ A L ~ E  ................................ 
NO FUEL IN AUXILIARY TANK 
H~TKFWDPUMP .................................. 
HITKXFERVALVE ................................ 
HITKXFEED .......................................... 
WHEN BALANCED. 
HITKXFEED .......................................... 
H ~ T K F W D ~ U M P  .................................. 
1 HYD SYSTEM PRESSURE (C) 
ENG PUMP ............................................. 
AUX PUMP ............................................. 
MTR PUMP ............................................. 
CONTROLLABILITY .............................. 
ON 
OPEN 
CLOSE 
MONITOR 
ON 
OPEN 
CLOSE 
OPEN 
ON 
CLOSE 
OPEN 
CLOSE 
OFF 
OFF 
OFF 
OFF 
REVIEW 
APPROACH 
FLAPSISLATS ....................................... 
IF FLAPSISLATS DO NOT MOVE, 
AIRSPEED ............................................. 
FLAPS/SLATS ........................................ 
IF FLAPSJSLATS W NOT MOVE, 
O(RET L w  .............................................. 
IF ONLY F U R S  MOVE, 
FLAPYSLATS ........................................ 
2ZAET L m  .......... 
OTHERWISE. 
F U p S S U T S  
IF SLATS RETRACT, 
FLAPYSLATS 
ZZEXT LJG 
OTHERWISE. 
35E)(TLm ............ 
2 H I D  SYSTEM PllESSURE (C) 
ENG PUMPS .......................................... 
CONTROLUBlLlTY .............................. 
APPROACH 
FLAPSJSUTS 
IF FLAPS W NOT MOVE. 
UEXT LJG . - ....... 
EXTEND 
REDUCE 
lS/EXT 
PERFORM 
ZZEXT 
PERFORM 
3 Y W T  
ZZEXT 
PERFORM 
PERFORM 
OFF 
REVIEW 
EXTEND 
PERFORM 
3 HYD SYSTEM PRESSURE (Cl 
IF QUANTITY IS OK. 
RAM AIRTURBINE ................................ 
OTHERWISE. 
ENG PUMP ............................................. 
AUX PUMP ............................................. 
MTR W M P  ............................................. 
CONTROLLABILITY .............................. 
APPROACH 
FUpSJSLATS 
IF FLAPYSLATS DO NOT MOVE. 
AIRSPEED ............................................. 
FLAPSJSLATS ........................................ 
IF FLAPSISLATS W NOT MOVE, 
OJRET L m  .......... 
IF ONLY FLAPS MOVE, 
FLApS/SLATS ........................................ 
2ZRET LJG ............................................ 
OTHERWISE. 
FLApYSUTS ........ 
IF SLATS RETRACT, 
FLAPSJSLATS ........................................ 
2ZEXT L w  ................................ 
OTHERWISE. 
3cJEXT L E  ..
UNLOCK 
OFF 
OFF 
OFF 
REVIEW 
EXTEND 
REDUCE 
lYEXT 
PERFORM 
2ZEXT 
PERFORM 
3YEXT 
ZZEXT 
PERFORM 
PERFORM 
FIGURE 10. EXAMPLE OF PAPER CHECKLIST. 
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With a two-person flight crew, the pilot not flying operates the aircraft systems. However, for this 
evaluation it was assumed that the first officer was incapacitated, and the captain flew the aircraft and 
operated the systems. This simulates the worst-case condition and increases the pilot's workload. The 
pilot flew the aircraft with manual throttles and the flight director in moderate turbulence. The 
simulator did dot have glareshield controls so that the pilot could not enter the heading, vertical-speed 
and altitude-select values. The experimenter, on cue from the computer program, acted as the ATC 
operator and gave the pilot vectors and clearances. Ten seconds after the computer cued the experi- 
menter, the select values were entered into the guidance commands by the computer program. 
The initial conditions simulated an altitude of 7,000 feet, a heading of 360 degrees, and an airspeed of 
220 knots. The experimenter instructed the pilot to descend to 4,000 feet and slow to 190 knots. When 
the aircraft leveled off at 4 , W  feet, the pilot was instructed to turn either to 330 or 030 degrees. After 
completing the turn, the pilot was instructed to descend and maintain 1,500 feet at 170 knots, and he was 
cleared to intercept the ILS. The trialended at the time the pilot intercepted theglideslope. The total time 
of the trial was approximately nine minutes. 
Three non-normal events were inserted into the scenarios at given time intervals. The time intervals were 
from 7 5  to 200 seconds for the first event, 200 to 350 seconds for the second, and 350 to 500 seconds for 
the third. These time intervals were selected so that one event would not interfere with the next event, 
and the pilot would not anticipate the exact time the event would occur. The event types and the alert 
levels were confounded with the experimental conditions. Also, the alert levels were nested within the 
event types and there was an unequal number of types for each alert level. The different non-normal 
events are listed in Table 1. There was a total of 18 scenarios with different combinations of non-normal 
events. For each condition, a pilot would receive one of the first six scenarios on his first trial and one of 
the last twelve on the second trial. Therefore, the first six event scenarios were repeated twice per pilot 
and the last twelve only once. Two of the first six-event scenarios contained three advisories, three 
scenarios contained two advisories and one caution, and one scenario contained one advisory and two 
cautions. For the last twelve scenarios, three scenarios contained two advisories and one caution, two 
scenarios contained one advisory and two cautions, and six scenarios contained one advisory, one 
caution and one warning. Therefore, each pilot received a total of 42 advisories, 26 cautions, and 6 warn- 
ings. The order in which the pilots received the event scenarios was counterbalanced between the pilots. 
When an alert occurred, the pilot was instructed to cancel the MCW annunciator, if necessary, and iden- 
tify the alert on the alert display. He would call up the system page on the SSD, if necessary, to identify 
and recognize the fault. If he had the interactive procedures, he would identify the corrective action on 
the SSD and perform the actions with the system controls. If he had the paper checklist, he would look 
up the fault, identify the actions on the checklist, and perform the actions. After performing the actions, 
he would verify the system status using the SSD. If  he had lost a hydraulic system, he was instructed to 
call up the control surface status page to review the operability of the aircraft. 
Performance Measures 
After completing each trial, the pilot was asked to rate workload involved in the task. A modified 
Cooper-Harper rating scale referred to as the Bedford scale15 was used for workload ratings. The 
reasons for selecting this scale were ease of application and pilot familiarity with the Cooper-Harper 
handling quality rating scale. In addition, the modified Cooper-Harper rating scale appears to be sen- 
sitive to differences in pilot workload.16. 17. 18 
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TABLE 1 
NONNORMAL EVENTS 
ADVISORY ALERTS 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
FUEL CONFIGURATION - TANK IMBALANCE WITHOUT FUEL IN THE CENTER TANK AND MAY OCCUR WITH 
EITHER WING TANK. THIS SCENARIO STARTS WITH ONE WING TANK WITH LESS FUELTHAN THE OTHER AND 
WITH THE LOW TANK ENGINE BURNING FASTER THAN THE OTHER TO CREATE AN IMBALANCE. THE PILOT IS 
REQUIRED TO TRANSFER FUEL FROM ONE TANK TO THE OTHER AND STOP TRANSFER WHEN THEY ARE 
BALANCED. 
FUEL CONFIGURATION - TANK IMBALANCE WITH FUEL IN CENTER TANK AND MAY OCCUR WITH EITHER 
WlNGTANK.THlS ISSIMILARTO NO. 1 EXCEPTTHEREISFUELINTHECENTERTANK ANDTHECENTERTANK 
PUMPS ARE OFF. IT REQUIRES THE PILOT TO TURN ON A CENTER TANK PUMP AND OPEN THE APPROPRIATE 
WING TANK FILL VALVE. 
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1 OR 3 ENGINE PUMP PRESSURE - THIS MAY OCCUR WITH THE ENGINE PUMPS ON 
SYSTEMS 1 AND 3 AS LONG AS THE REVERSIBLE MOTOR PUMP IS ON. CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO TURN THE 
MOTOR PUMP ON AND THE AFFECTED PUMP OFF. 
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 2 ENGINE PUMP 2 PRESSURE - THIS OCCURS IF ENGINE 1 PUMP IS ARMED, AND THE 
ONLY ACTION REQUIRED IS TO TURN OFF ENGINE PUMP 2. 
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM QUANTITY - THIS MAY OCCUR IN ANY OF THE THREE HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS. CORREC- 
TIVE ACTION IS TO TURN THE AFFECTED PUMPS OFF, BUT EVEN SO, IT IS FOLLOWED BY LOW SYSTEM 
PRESSURE (CAUTION). 
CAUTION ALERTS 
6.  FUEL LOW PRESSURE - THIS IS CAUSED BY LOW AFT PUMP PRESSURE WITH FORWARD PUMP NORMALLY 
OFF AND CAN OCCUR WITH EITHER WING TANK. CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO TURN THE FORWARD PUMP ON. 
7. FUEL LOW PRESSURE - THIS IS WITH BOTH FORWARD AND AFT PUMPS FAILED AND MAY OCCUR WITH 
EITHER WING TANK. CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO CROSSFEED FUEL. 
8. HYDRAULICSYSTEM FAILURE-THISMAY OCCUR WITH ANY OFTHETHREESYSTEMS. ITMAY BECAUSEDBY 
LOW QUANTITY OR THE LOSS OF ALL PUMPS ON A SYSTEM. THE ONLY CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO TURN OFF 
CRAFT OR DEPLOYMENT OF A SECONDARY SURFACE. 
THE AFFECTED PUMPS. LOSS OF A HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MAY AFFECT THE CONTROL RESPONSE OF THE AIR- 
WARNING ALERT 
9. DUAL HYDRAULIC FAILURE -THIS MAY OCCUR WITH ANY COMBINATION OF TWO SYSTEMS. THE ONLY COR- 
RECTIVE ACTION IS TO TURN OFF THE AFFECTED PUMPS. THE CONTROL RESPONSE AND DEPLOYMENT OF 
THE SECONDARY CONTROL SURFACES IS AFFECTED. 
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A time-event record of all the discrete events was made and placed into a data file. These events included 
simulated ATC directives, alert annunciations, and all discrete actions performed by the pilot including 
secondary control actions, MCW cancellations, SSD control actions, and system control actions. This 
record was analyzed to determine the following: 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5 .  
6. 
Alert Acknowledgment Time - The time between the alert annunciation and the MCW can- 
cellation or, in the case of advisories, the SSD page selection. 
Abnormal Procedure Completion Time - The time between the MCW cancellation or the SSD 
page selection and the completion of all the system actions. 
Number of Discrete Actions to Complete the Procedure - The number of discrete actions the pilot 
completed to process an alert. 
Procedure Errors - The discrete actions on  the time-event record were reviewed by the experi- 
menter who divided each event occurrence into four categories: (1) the pilot performed the pro- 
cedures according to the interactive list or the paper checklist, (2) the pilot completed the pro- 
cedures but did not follow the interactive procedures or the checklist, (3) the pilot completed the 
procedures but made errors in the process, and (4) the pilot failed to complete the procedures. 
RMS Tracking Errors - RMS tracking errors were measured for those parameters that were to be 
held steady for a flight segment. These included heading while the aircraft was not turning, vertical 
speed while the aircraft was descending, and airspeed. These values were measured and recorded at 
five-second intervals. A 20-second window at the time the events occurred was used to evaluate the 
tracking performance. This was based upon selecting a time window shorter than the average event 
processing time. 
Control Activity - The control activity included the number of times the pilot changed the direc- 
tion of the primary flight controls; i.e., elevator, ailerons, and rudder and the number of times he 
hit  the pitch trim button. The total number of counts were analyzed for the same 20-second win- 
dow that the tracking errors were analyzed. 
RESULTS 
A within-group, repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was used to analyze the 
parametric measures, and the Chi Square test was used for the contingency analysis of the correct 
responses. The treatment conditions were the two display formats, the three control interfaces, the two 
types of procedure information, the order of the two trials, and the order of the two events within a trial. 
An attempt was made to determine if  the event-type or the alert-level influenced performance. However, 
as mentioned in the procedure, the event-type and its alert-level were confounded with the other experi- 
mental conditions. Two separate, one-way ANOVA tests were used to analyze the measures by event- 
type and alert-level. However, alert-level was nested within event-type and there were an unequal 
number of event-types within each alert-level category. If the alert-level was significant, then separate 
ANOVAs were performed for event-types within an alert-level. If there were no significant differences 
within an alert-level, it was assumed that the alert-level contributed to the differences in performance. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT TIME 
A summary of the significant ANOVA results for acknowledgment time are presented in Table 2. The 
complete ANOVA tables for all the experimental results are presented in Appendix F. Table 2 shows that 
the type of procedure information, the trial order, the event order and their first order interactions were 
significant. Both alert-level and event-types are significant, which may be responsible for the differences 
in the trial and event order. The average detection times for type of procedure information are shown in 
Figure 1 1 .  The differences between event-types are shown in Figure 12. There were no significant dif- 
ferences between event-types within the advisory or the caution-alert levels. Figure 12 shows that detec- 
tion time was longer for advisory-alerts than either the caution- or warning-alerts. 
TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT TIME ANOVAs 
VARIABLE DEGREES OF FREEDOM F RATIO PROBABILITY 
PROCEDURE 
TRIAL 
EVENT 
PT 
PE 
TE 
PRIMARY VARIABLES 
(IF P>0.05 THE VARIABLE IS NOT LISTED) 
1,11 
1,11 
1,11 
1,11 
1,11 
1,11 
13.01 
11.99 
19.60 
5.33 
10.39 
8.89 
0.01 
0.01 
0.001 
0.05 
0.01 
0.01 
ALERT 
ALERT LEVEL 
2,22 12.89 0.001 
TYPE 
~~ 
EVENT TYPE 
a,m 6.57 0.001 
TYPE 
ADVISORY EVENTS 
4-44 2.01 0.10 
TYPE 
CAUTION EVENTS 
2,22 1.20 0.30 
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FIGURE 11. ACKNOWLEDGMENT TIMES AVERAGED ACROSS PILOTS FOR TYPE OF 
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FIGURE 12. ACKNOWLEDGMENT TIME AVERAGED ACROSS PILOTS FOR EVENT TYPE. 
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COMPLETION TIME 
The ANOVA results for the completion time are presented in Table 3 which shows that display format 
and procedure information were very significant while the control interface was significant. These dif- 
ferences are illustrated in Figures 13 to 15. Figure 13 shows that, on the average, text takes 1.3 times 
TABLE 3 
SUMMARY OF PROCESSING TIME ANOVAs 
VARIABLE DEGREES OF FREEDOM F RATIO PROBABILITY 
PRIMARY VARIABLES 
(IF P>0.05 THE VARIABLE IS NOT LISTED) 
DISPLAY 1,11 21.15 0.001 
PROCEDURE 1,ll 22.87 0.001 
CONTROLS 1,11 3.55 0.05 
ALERT LEVEL 
ALERT 2,22 6.24 0.01 
EVENT TYPE 
TYPE 8,88 10.04 0.001 
ADVISORY EVENTS 
TYPE 4,44 14.54 0.001 
TYPE 
CAUTION EVENTS 
2,22 4.82 0.05 
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FIGURE 13. COMPLETION TIME AVERAGE ACROSS PILOTS FOR DISPLAY FORMATS. 
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20 
longer to process than pictorial formats. Figure 14 shows that the dedicated overhead panel takes 1.25 
times longer to process than either the touch panel or the line select keys, and Figure 15 shows that paper 
checklists take 2 times longer to process than interactive procedures. Significant differences were obtained 
for the alert-levels, event-types, and event-types within an alert-level. Figure 16 shows the completion 
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FIGURE 16. COMPLETION TIME AVERAGE ACROSS PILOTS FOR EVENT TYPE. 
DISCRETE ACTIONS TO COMPLETE PROCEDURES 
The results for the number of discrete actions are shown in Table 4. There were significant differences 
for procedure information and the trial-event interaction. The differences for procedure information 
are shown in Figure 17. The pilots required more actions to complete the procedures with the paper 
checklist than with the interactive procedures. There were significant differences for alert-level and for 
event-types within the alert-level. The number of processing steps by event-type is shown in Figure 18. 
These differences in event-type may account for the trial-event order interaction. 
PROCEDURE ERRORS 
The procedure errors were differentiated into four categories: (1) correct and according to procedure, 
(2) correct but not according to procedure, (3) correct but errors made in the procedures, and (4) incor- 
rect or not completed. A Chi Square contingency analysis was performed on the frequency of occur- 
rence of the various categories for the experimental conditions. The results of this analysis are shown in 
Table 5 .  The only variable that was significant was the type of procedure information. Table 6 presents 
the percentage of errors by procedure type. The interactive procedures showed a higher percentage of 
correct responses and more completions using the correct procedure than the paper checklists. A 
between-group analysis was performed to determine if the group who received the interactive procedure 
condition first had fewer errors with the paper checklists than the group who received the paper checklist 
condition first. The results are presented in Table 7 .  There were no significant differences between the 
two groups (Chi Square = 2.33 with 3 degrees of freedom). 
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TABLE 4 
SUMMARY OF DISCRETE ACTIONS STEPS ANOVAs 
VARIABLE DEGREES OF FREEDOM F RATIO PROBABILITY 
PRIMARY VARIABLES 
(IF P>0.05THE VARIABLE IS NOT LISTED) 
PROCEDURE 1,11 12.89 0.01 
TE 1,11 6.94 0.05 
ALERT LEVEL 
LEVEL 2,22 19.91 0.001 
EVENT TYPE 
TYPE 8,88 14.82 0.001 
ADVISORY EVENTS 
TYPE 4,44 17.90 0.001 
CAUTION EVENTS 
TYPE 2,22 13.37 0.001 
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TABLE 5 
RESULTS OF THE CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS FOR PROCEDURE ERRORS 
CHI SQUARE DF PROBABILITY VARIABLE 
DISPLAY 3.136 3 NS 
CONTROL 7.446 6 NS 
PROCEDURE 52.365 3 0.001 
TABLE 6 
PERCENTAGE OF PROCEDURE ERRORS FOR PROCEDURE TYPE 
PAPER CHECKLIST INTERACTIVE PROCEDURE 
CORRECT FOLLOWED 
PROCEDURE 38 66 
CORRECT DID NOT 
FOLLOW PROCEDURE 
CORRECT BUT 
ERRORS MADE 
16 7 
I 30 22 
I NCO R RECT 16 5 J 
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TABLE 7 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS FOR PROCEDURE ERRORS 
ON THE CHECKLIST CONDITION 
PAPER CHECKLIST FIRST INTERACTIVE PROCEDURES FIRST 
CORRECT FOLLOWED 
PROCEDURE 39.9 33.9 
CORRECT DID NOT 
FOLLOW PROCEDURE 12.6 19.0 
CORRECT BUT 
ERRORS MADE I 30.1 29.8 
INCORRECT 17.5 15.5 
FLIGHT PERFORMANCE 
A summary of the ANOVA tests for tracking performance are shown in Tables 8,9,  and 10. The display 
format variable was significant for the heading rms error analysis as well as a number of significant inter- 
actions. The text format showed less heading error than the pictorial format. On the other hand, the 
heading rms error for alert-level or event-type was not significant. There were no significant differences 
in the vertical speed error for the primary experimental variables. There were significant differences for 
alert-level and event-type as well as event-type within alert-level. The vertical speed error for the dit- 
ferent alert types are shown in Figure 19. For the airspeed error, there were no main effects but tivo 
significant interactions. There were no differences for alert-level and event-type. 
TABLE 8 
SUMMARY OF VERTICAL SPEED RMS ERROR ANOVAs 
PROBABILITY VARIABLE DEGREES OF FREEDOM F RATIO 
PRIMARY VARIABLES 
(IF P>0.05 THE VARIABLE IS NOT LISTED) 
(NONE) 
ALERTLEVEL 
LEVEL 2,22 5.17 0.05 I 
~~~ 
EVENT TYPE 
TYPE 8,88 3.53 0.01 
ADVISORY EVENTS 
TYPE 4 4 4  17.90 0.001 
CAUTION EVENTS 
TYPE 2,22 13.37 0.001 
TABLE 9 
SUMMARY OF HEADING RMS ERROR ANOVAs 
PROBABILITY VARIABLE DEGREES OF FREEDOM F RATIO 
PRIMARY VARIABLES 
(IF P>0.05 THE VARIABLE IS NOT LISTED) 
DISPLAY 
DT 
CT 
TE 
PT E 
DCPT 
DCTE 
1,11 
1,11 
2.22 
1.11 
1,11 
2,22 
2.22 
7.64 
6.09 
6.62 
5.42 
6.26 
3.59 
4.73 
0.05 
0.05 
0.01 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
ALERT LEVEL 
LEVEL 2.22 2.97 0.07 
EVENT TYPE 
TYPE 888 1.16 0.33 
TABLE 10 
SUMMARY OF AIRSPEED RMS ERROR ANOVAs 
VARIABLE DEGREES OF FREEDOM F RATIO PROBABILITY 
PRIMARY VARIABLES 
(IF P>0.05 THE VARIABLE IS NOT LISTED) 
DT 1,11 8.19 0.05 
DC P 2.22 3.97 0.05 
ALERT LEVEL 
LEVEL 2.22 1.28 0.30 
EVENT TYPE 
TYPE 8.88 1.24 0.29 
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FIGURE 19. VERTICAL SPEED RMS ERROR AVERAGED ACROSS PILOTS FOR EVENT TYPES. 
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CONTROL ACTIVITY 
The data in Table 1 1  show that event-order was significant. Event-type was not significant but alert-level 
was highly significant. Also event-types within an alert-level were not significant. The control activity 
for the different event-types is shown in Figure 20, which shows that the control activity was less for the 
warning alert which was only one event-type, while little difference occurred between the other event- 
types. 
- 
VARIABLE DEGREES OF FREEDOM F RATIO PROBABILITY 
PRIMARY VARIABLES 
(IF P>0.05 THE VARIABLE IS NOT LISTED) 
EVENT 1,11 40.21 0.001 
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2,22 16.78 0.001 
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FIGURE 20. CONTROL ACTIVITY AVERAGED ACROSS PILOTS FOR EVENT TYPES. 
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PILOT RATING OF WORKLOAD 
The workload ratings were analyzed with ANOVA, and the results are presented in Table 12. The pilots 
rated the display formats, the control interfaces, and the interaction of the two as significantly different. 
The average ratings for the display and control interfaces are shown in Figure 21. There were no dif- 
ferences between the two display formats for the dedicated overhead panel control interface, but the pic- 
torial format was rated lower for the other two control interfaces. There were no significant differences 
between the two procedure conditions. 
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TABLE 12 
SUMMARY OF WORKLOAD RATING ANOVAs 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM F RATIO PROBABILITY VARIABLE 
- 
. 
. 
. 
' 
DISPLAY 
CONTROL 
DC 
PRIMARY VARIABLES 
(IF P>0.05 THE VARIABLE IS NOT LISTED) 
1,11 
2,22 
2,22 
13.06 
17.92 
7.02 
0.01 
0.001 
0.01 
7.0 
x PICTORIAL 
A TEXT 
I I I 
4.0 OVERHEAD LINE SELECT TOUCH 
PANEL KEYS PANEL 
NOTE: BAR REPRESENTS k 1  STANDARD ERROR OF THE MEAN 
FIGURE 21. WORKLOAD RATINGS AVERAGED ACROSS PILOTS FOR DISPLAY FORMATS AND 
CONTROL INTERFACES. 
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PILOT RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The pilots were asked to give their subjective preference for the treatment conditions as well as specific 
questions about the display formats, the controls, and the procedures. Table 13 shows the results of their 
preferences. I t  also shows that all the pilots preferred the pictorial formats and the interactive procedures 
and the majority preferred the touch panel. 
The pilots responded to the other questions as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
Color is used to indicate the alert level of the faulted components; is this an appropriate use of color? 
Color is satisfactory 80 
Cyan is inappropriate as an advisory 
(usually indicates non-normal status) 10 
Use color to differentiate partially failed 
control surfaces on the controls page. 10 
Do you recommend any changes to the pictorial formats? 
Format is satisfactory 60 
Should be simpler 20 
Should be more complex 20 
With the overhead panel; is the system display necessary? 
Yes, it  is necessary 80 
I t  is desirable 20 
With automated system control, is system information necessary? 
Yes, i t  is necessary 60 
I t  is desirable 30 
It is not required 10 
QUESTION 
FORMAT 
SYSTEM 
CONTROL 
CONTROL INTERFACE 
PROCEDURE 
TABLE 13 
PI LOT PREFERENCES 
PREFERENCE 
PlCTO RI A L 
PICTORIAL 
ALPHANUMERIC TEXT 
OVERHEAD PANEL 
TOUCH PANEL 
BEZEL PANEL 
TOUCH OR BEZEL 
INTERACTIVE 
PERCENT 
100 
90 
10 
10 
60 
20 
10 
100 
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DISCUSSION 
DISPLAY FORMAT 
Both the objective and subjective performance measures indicate that the pictorial formats are superior 
to the alphanumeric text for system status information. The pilots had problems with the alphanumeric 
text even though the systems were similar to those of the DC- 10 and all except one of the pilots had espe- 
rience on the DC-IO. In general, the pilots had no problems with the pictorial schematics. Several pilots 
mentioned that it required more time to read the alphanumeric text and associate i t  with their knowledge 
of the system to determine the system status while the status was readily apparent with the pictorial 
schematic. 
There are various questions involved with the development of pictorial formats for system information. 
One question is how far to go with pictorial information. Should a display format designer try ,to 
minimize text and use pictorial symbolics whenever possible, and when does the symbolic information 
start to become vague? Another question is the complexity of the displayed information. One of the 
guidelines for the design of the formats3 was to keep the information in a simple format. Although some 
pilots thought the formats were too simple, the majority of pilots thought that the complexity was 
satisfactory, and two pilots thought it should be less complex for easier assimilation. 
The systems displays were presented in pages. The first page was a graphic display without quantitative 
information. If the pilot wanted quantitative information, he could call up the second page. Only one of 
the events required the pilot to look at the quantitative information which increased the number of steps 
for that event. However, it probably improved the response time for the other events. I t  appears that 
presenting information in pages going from a general status to more detailed information is a satisfac- 
tory approach. 
Normally, when a dual hydraulic failure occurs, the pilots are required to change their flight plans and 
review the operability of the control surfaces. However, in this study the aircraft was on final approach 
and the pilot’s options were to  continue the approach or abort. The scenario did not force them to look 
at the control surface page in order to fly the aircraft and they only looked at it as part of the procedures. 
Therefore, this evaluation did not test the utility of a pictorial control surface page. One pilot com- 
mented that the text was as easy to  comprehend as the pictorial. Another pilot said “at this point. you 
don’t need to look at the page, you just fly the aircraft.’’ One pilot commented that there was too much 
information on the page. Another pilot wanted the degree of failure color-coded rather than the alert- 
level color-coded. 
SYSTEM CONTROL 
The performance measure, event processing time, and the pilot workload rating were sensitive to dif- 
ferences in the control interface. The touch panel and the bezel-mounted keys had the same event proc- 
essing time and were rated equal in workload. The dedicated overhead panel had both a higher process- 
ing time and a higher workload. The results did not differentiate between type of control but to dif- 
ferences in the location of the control. Therefore, the critical factor, as far as the control interface, is the 
location and association with the system information. Since there were no differences between the 
number of processing steps or the error rate between the different controllers, it appears as if multifunc- 
tion controls are not detrimental t o  performance. 
The touch panel was preferred by the majority of the pilots. The principal reason was that the location of 
control is the same as the location of the information. With the bezel-mounted switches, mental effort 
was required to associate the switch location with the information location. 
29 
Pilot comments on switch activation were that the touch panel causes more problems than either the 
overhead or bezel-mounted switches. This was primarily due to the parallax problem with the virtual 
switch location, switch bounce, and the sensitivity of the touch screen. This led to turning the wrong 
component on, turning the component on-off in rapid succession, and repeated touching of the screen. 
PROCEDURE INFORMATION 
As anticipated, interactive procedures improved performance over a paper checklist. This was evident 
by the decrease in detection time, processing time, processing steps, and error rate. Although the inter- 
action of procedure information and the alert level could not be analyzed, it appears that the decrease in 
detection time was caused by a decrease in time for the advisory alerts. The pilots could easily miss an 
advisory since there was no master annunciation and the aural tone occurred once. The only remaining 
cues were the message on the alert display and the magenta procedures on the SSD (if i t  was on the cor- 
rect status page). These procedures would act as an additional cue to the pilot, and he would respond to 
the status display in addition to  the alerting system. 
The paper checklist required more processing time due to finding the checklist, looking up the pro- 
cedure, and reading i t  off the checklist. Also, the information was displayed in two different formats 
with the interactive procedures. With the pictorial display, the action adverb with an arrow to the com- 
ponent was displayed, and with the text the component name was followed by the action. The latter 
required the pilot to relate the name associated with the status information. Even though there was not a 
significant interaction between display format and procedure information, the pictorial display with the 
interactive procedure had 57 percent of the event processing time compared to the alphanumeric text 
with the interactive procedures. With the paper checklist, the pictorial had 87 percent of the processing 
time compared to the text. This implies that reducing the procedure information to pictorial information 
with minimum text reduces the number of mental steps and improves performance. 
Another improvement with interactive procedures is in the error rate. This is due to (1) the display of the 
correct procedure instead of the crew relying on their memory or looking i t  up in the paper checklist, and 
(2) information feedback by the removal of the procedure once i t  has been completed. These factors 
reduce both the number of processing steps and the error rate. 
The most significant problem with interactive procedures was revealed by an observation by the experi- 
menter. The pilots responded to  the procedures without diagnosing the problem. In fact, i t  turned out to 
be a game of trying to remove the procedure information from the display without ascertaining the 
status of the system. This would cause a problem if the interactive procedures d o  not cure the problem or 
provide assistance. The same problem will exist with automated systems when the pilot has to provide 
manual backup. Will the pilots have enough knowledge about the system operation to be able to respond 
correctly and in a timely manner? 
FLIGHT PERFORMANCE 
The flight performance was analyzed to  determine i f  the experimental variables had an effect upon the 
primary flight task. There does not appear to be consistent results between the experimental variables 
and the flight performance measures. The text format shows less heading rms error, but there were a 
number of significant interactions. A possible explanation of tracking scores is that the sampling win- 
dow for the rnis deviations was too small to obtain reliable scores. 
The only consistent difference in flight performance was in the vertical speed rms error where the caution 
and warning event types had consistently higher error scores than the advisories. in addition, the control 
activity, a measure of attention paid to the primary flight task, was less with the warning event type. 
These effects may be due to the type of failure rather than the alert-level since the hydraulic caution and 
warning alerts affect the controllability of the aircraft. 
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The pilot’s primary task was to fly the aircraft in a high workload situation. The pilots continued to fly 
the aircraft within reasonable limits and kept it  on the approach pattern on every trial. Therefore, if  the 
pilots exceeded their workload capacity, it appeared as degradation in processing the alert events rather 
than the primary flight task. 
I  ALERTING SYSTEM 
The performance measures were analyzed according to alert level to determine if  the results concurred 
with the alerting systems standardization study. l 9  However, due to the noncentral location of the alert 
display and the emphasis of the study, the pilots tended to look at the SSD display prior to looking at the 
alert display. The advisory alerts had significantly longer detection times than the other two alerts. 
Advisory alerts only have a single tone and the text message on the alert display. Due to the high 
workload and the frequency of occurrence of the alerts, the advisory alerts were often missed or the 
pilots delayed acknowledgment. Another factor that contributed to the longer detection times was the 
difference in scoring. The caution and warnings were scored from the time the event occurred to the 
cancellation of the MCW. Advisories were scored from the time the event occurred to the paging of theSSD. 
I 
I 
The only other effect of alert-level appeared to be the control activity where the warning alert had less 
activity than either the advisories or the cautions. This would indicate that the pilots were paying more 
attention to the alerts than the primary flight task. However, this may be due to the nature of the warn- 
ing alert since they were all dual hydraulic failures which affected the controllability of the aircraft. 
Another observation by the experimenter was that the majority of pilots read down the list and expected 
the last alert to occur at the bottom of an alert category instead of at the top of the category. It appears to 
be natural for a person to read down a video display terminal and have the latest occurring line appear at 
the bottom of the screen. Although the pilots could learn that the last alert is at the top, they may regress, 
especially if there are other computer readouts with the latest information at the bottom of the list. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of this study, the following recommendations are made for future research on aircraft system 
displays and application for future cockpit design. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
Pictorial formats should be used to display aircraft systems information whenever possible. The 
addition of text to these displays should be kept to a minimum. Further studies are required to 
determine how complex this information should be. 
Even though graphic design 2 1  were used to develop the formats for this study), there is 
a lack of empirical evidence that these principles are better than any other principles for system 
display design. Further studies are required on design principles for system display guidelines and 
validation by empirical evaluation. 
System controls should be located and associated with the display of system information. The 
closer these controls are to the pilot's primary flight task, the better the performance. I f  the 
technical problems can be solved with the touch panels; (Le., parallax, virtual switch size, feed- 
back, etc.), they are an acceptable method of control, since the control location is coincident with 
the status information. 
With automated aircraft systems, the crew should have knowledge of the system and be able to pro- 
vide manual backup. This requires the crew to have access to system status and the backup pro- 
cedures. Interactive procedures improve the crew's ability to process the events but they become 
dependent upon this interactive information instead of learning the system. More work is required 
to determine how these procedures should be used and how to keep the crew involved in the task. 
Since this study found that the pilot read the bottom alert on the alert display as being the latest 
alert, the guidelines on the chronological listing of alerts from top-down that were developed as 
part of the Alerting Systems Standardization Study' should be reviewed. 
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2. 
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9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
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APPENDIX A 
DESCRIPTION OF FUEL AND HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS 
FUEL SYSTEM 
The fuel model provides positive fuel pressure for feeding both engines. The consumption of fuel 
depends upon the throttle setting of the engines. Also, the engines could be set so that one would burn 
more fuel than the other to create a fuel imbalance. The fuel system consisted of three tanks: two main 
wing tanks and an auxiliary fuselage tank. Each tank had two fuel pumps where each pump had ade- 
quate flow for supplying both engines during takeoff. The fuel manifold interconnects the three tanks 
with fill valves, and crossfeed valves supply the engine manifolds. Each main tank has a float valve 
switch which will continually fill the main tank from the auxiliary tank as long as an auxiliary tank pump 
is on. The auxiliary tank pumps will turn off automatically when the tank is empty. The fuel system 
schematic is shown in Figure A-1. 
The normal configuration is to have the aft pumps on in the main tanks, a pump on in the auxiliary tank, 
the main tank fill valves armed, and the crossfeed valves closed. If a fuel imbalance occurs, a fuel 
schedule advisory occurs. If fuel is remaining in the main tank, the fill valve on the high tank is closed 
until the two tanks are balanced. If no  fuel is remaining in the auxiliary tank, then the fill valve is closed 
and the crossfeed valve is open until the tanks are balanced. If there is low pressure in the engine 
manifold, a caution alert occurs. The forward pump is turned on and if the low pressure remains, the 
crossfeed valves are opened to supply fuel from either the auxiliary tank or the other main tank. 
TANK 1 AUX TANK TANK 2 
r--1 &r 6100 G 
FIGURE A.I. SCHEMATIC OF THE FUEL SYSTEM 
LEGEND 
0 SHUTOFF VALVE 
FLOATVALVE 
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HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 
The hydraulic system consists of three parallel continuously pressurized systems as shown in Figure A-2. 
Independent reservoirs supply fluid to each system. System 1 is powered by a left-engine-driven pump 
and 3 auxiliary pump for backup and ground operations. System 2 is normally powered by a right- 
engine-driven pump but with loss of pressure the left-engine pump is automatically turned on i f  armed. 
System 3 is powered by a right-engine-driven pump, an auxiliary pump for backup and ground opera- 
tions, and a ram air turbine. In addition, there is a reversible motor pump which transfers power between 
Systems 1 and 2, if there is loss of pressure in either system. 
SYS 1 SYS 2 SYS 3 
10 GAL 
1-3 MTR 1 
1 
FIGURE A-2. SCHEMATIC OF THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 
1 
The relationship between the hydraulic system and the control surfaces is shown in Figure A-3. The loss 
of one hydraulic system will result in a reduction in the number of active spoilers, the possibility of the 
loss of a horizontal stabilizer actuator reducing the pitch trim rate, and the loss of an actuator to the 
flaps/slats resulting in a reduction in the airspeed at which they will deploy. The loss of two hydraulic 
systems will reduce the redundancy of the primary control surfaces affecting the control power, reduce 
the number of active spoilers, the loss of either the flaps or slats, and depending on which hydraulic 
system is lost, the loss of pitch trim. 
I 
I 
I f  there is low pump pressure, it will cause an advisory alert without the loss of system pressure. Crew 
actions are to clean up the system; that is, to turn on the auxiliary pump and turn off the affected engine- 
driven pump. With the loss of hydraulic system pressure, a caution alert occurs and action by the crew is 
to clean up the hydraulic system and to determine the effect on flight operation. With the loss of a second 
hydraulic system, a warning alert occurs. The action by the crew is to clean up the affected hydraulic 
system and to determine the effect upon the aircraft. 
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FIGURE A-3. HYDRAULIC SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM 
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APPENDIX B 
SYSTEM STATUS DISPLAY FORMATS 
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6097 GAL 14600GAL 6097 GAL 
-~ 
FIGURE B-1. PICTORIAL FORMAT FOR THE FUEL SYSTEM 
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FIGURE 8-2. ALPHANUMERIC TEXT FORMAT FOR THE FUEL SYSTEM 
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FIGURE 6-3. PICTORIAL FORMAT FOR THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 
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FIGURE 6-4. ALPHANUMERIC TEXT FORMAT FOR THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 
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FIGURE 8.5. PICTORIAL FORMAT FOR THE CONTROL SURFACES 
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FIGURE B-6. ALPHANUMERIC TEXT FORMAT FOR THE CONTROL SURFACES 
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APPENDIX D 
PILOT BRIEFING 
The objective of this study is to evaluate alternative display control interfaces for aircraft systems con- 
trol. Control of aircraft systems on  advanced commercial aircraft will be automated. The issues are how 
the crew will interact with these automated systems and their ability to operate the systems in a manual 
backup mode. The specific issues addressed are: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
How should the system information be displayed on multifunction displays? 
If mulitfunction controls are used, do they degrade performance as compared to dedicated controls? 
For manual system control, do interactive procedures on the display improve performance com- 
pared to paper checklists? 
The study will attempt to evaluate your ability to interact in both normal and abnormal situations with 
the fuel and hydraulic systems while flying an approach. The aircraft is a two-engine widebody with 
handling qualities of a DC-IO. Normally, this is a two-crew operation where one pilot flies the aircraft 
and the other interacts with the system. However, we are assuming a worst-case condition where one of 
the pilots is incapacitated. 
The flight displays are electromechanical instruments. The left center CRT is the System Status Display 
and the right display is a dedicated alert display. The other portion of the right display would normally 
be occupied by engine displays, It is assumed that these displays are interchangeable and for normal two- 
crew operations they would be reversed. The displays have been moved aft so that they are within reach 
to touch the controls. However, this does create a viewing angle and parallax problem. 
The SSD display has multiple pages which contain the following information: 
1. Phase of flight information - These are text displays that contain information pertinent to the 
phase of flight. 
Hydraulic system - There are two pages: one consists of the status and the other includes quan- 
titative information with the status. 
Fuel system - There are two pages similar to the hydraulic system. 
Control surface - This contains information on the operability of the control surface as well as 
position information. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
You may select any page at any time by using the control panel which is located in the pedestal forward 
of the throttle quadrant. Normally, the flight phase page will be displayed except when there is either a 
caution or warning alert. When the latter cases occur, the appropriate systems page is displayed. The 
selection of the pages will depend on  the phase of flight, an alert, or manual selection via the control 
panel. Part of the evaluation will have procedures on the pages that will interact with system state and 
actions performed by the pilot. 
You will be given two different display formats as an experimental condition: one will be pictorial 
schematics of the systems and a pictorial of the control surfaces and the other will be text containing the 
same information. Another experimental condition will be procedures on  the system display that inter- 
act with the system state and the actions performed by the pilot. The other condition will be without 
these procedures and you will have to rely on paper checklists. 
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The Schematics are self-explanatory. The text is structured so that the spatial relationships of com- 
ponents are the same as on  the schematics. The first page of the system shows the status of the com- 
ponents and the second page adds quantitative information to the status. The control surface page 
s h o w  a plan view of the aircraft with an outline of the control surfaces. I f  a control surface is operating 
normally, i t  is shown by a green outline. I f  i t  is inoperative, i t  is shown with solid fill in the appropriate 
alert-level color. I f  i t  is partially operative (i.e., with one actuator), i t  is shown with partial f i l l  in the 
appropriate alert-level color. 
The color code is the following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
The alert-level colors are red - warning, amber - caution, and cyan - advisory. 
White is used for titles and names of the systems and the components, 
Green is used for systems and components that are operating normally. 
Magenta is used for the procedures. 
For the experimental condition where there are procedures on the system pages, the schematics will have 
the action and an arrow to the component when there is a non-normal condition. For the text and the 
displayed procedures that are not interactive, the component or system and the action are identified. For 
the interactive procedures they will disappear after the action is performed. The noninteractive pro- 
cedures will remain displayed until the non-normal condition goes away. 
You will beable to interact with the fuel and hydraulic systems by one of three methods, depending upon 
the experimental condition: (1) adedicated overhead panel, (2) a touch panel overlay of the SSD, and ( 3 )  
bezel-mounted switches where dashed lines show which switch a component is connected, similar to line 
select keys. These inputs will allow you to control the state of the system. 
The fuel system consists of two main tanks and an auxiliary tank. Each tank has two pumps and a fill 
valve. There is a manifold between the tank with two crossfeed valves that permit total crossfeed 
capability and transfer between the tanks. The main tank fil l  valves have float switches which close 
automatically when the tanks are full. The auxiliary tank pumps will also turn off automatically when 
the tank is empty. 
The hydraulic system consists of three parallel systems. System 1 is powered by a left-engine-driven 
pump and an auxiliary pump. System 2 is normally powered by a right-engine pump but with loss of 
pressure the left-engine pump turns o n  if it is armed. System 3 is powered by a right-engine pump, an 
auxiliary pump and a ram air turbine. In addition, a reversible motor pump transfers power between 
Systems 1 and 3 when there is a loss of pressure in either system. 
The hydraulic system is interconnected with the control surfaces similar to the DC-10. So with the loss of 
a hydraulic system, the controllability of the aircraft is affected. 
I 
I 
The alert system will consist of the MCW display on the glareshield, aural tones, and the alert list on the 
right display. The alert list will contain text annunciations of the alerts in their appropriate color. There 
are three distinct aural tones for caution, warning, and advisory alerts. Pushing the MCW cancels the 
light and the aural, but the alert list remains until the alerting condition goes away. 
I 
First, you will go through the normal start procedures. Second, you will go through the approach with a I 
sample of alerts, and this will be repeated with each of control interfaces and the displays. You will have 
the chance to try more flights if  you think it is necessary. I 
4a 
You will be flying with manual throttles and a flight director. The handling qualities are that of a DC-IO. 
You will start at a heading of 360 and a speed of 220 knots. The  course pointer is aligned with the ILS. 
You will be given vectors to the ILS and approximately 10 seconds after these are given, the flight director 
and fast/slow indicator will present these commands as if you rotated the speed and heading select controls. 
Since we are attempting to measure workload with the different configurations, perform all .the 
necessary normal and abnormal functions during the approach. The primary emphasis in this evaluation 
is the accuracy and the speed at which you can interact with the systems. Continue in the approach until 
you think it  is unsafe to land and then initiate a go-around maneuver. Normally, the simulation will be I 
, terminated after you intercept the glideslope. 
1 
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APPENDIX E 
EVALUATION FORM 
NO: ___ DATE: 
NAME: POSITION: 
BIRTH DATE: 
WEAR GLASSESEONTACTS FOR FLYING? YES - NO - 
ACTIVE FLIGHT DUTY? YES __ NO __ 
TRANSPORT EXPERIENCE 
AIRCRAFT TYPENODEL NO. OF HRS POSITION DATE RATED 
PRECEDWG PAGE BLANK NOT mMB)I 
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CONDITION RATING 
1 
3 
4 
6 
10 
11 
12 
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1) Which of the two formats, pictorial schematics or text, do you prefer for the following systems information? (Please explain) 
a) Fuel and hydraulic systems. 
2) In both formats color is used to indicate the faulted components and the alert level. Is this the appropriate use of color? 
Do you have any recommendations for other uses in this application? 
3) Do you have any suggestions for changes in the pictorial formats? 
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4) Do you have any suggestions for changes in the text formats? 
5) Which of the control interfaces do you prefer: dedicated overhead panel, touch panel or the bezel panel? (Please explain) 
6) With the dedicated control panel is the system information necessary? (Please explain) 
7) With automated control of the systems is the system information necessary? (Please explain) 
6) Which do you prefer: the interactive procedures or the paper checklists? (Please explain) 
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APPENDIX F 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES 
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18 ERROR 
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23 ERROR 
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24 ERROR 
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30 ERROR 
CPRE 
31 ERROR 
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32 ERROR 
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29~0,5130a2 
,790 691 16 
31/3 84218 
527,56907 
5180*05576 
372 4 37715 
13251 IS990 
3775,32421 
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?PO ,691 16 
315,90333 
313,78454 
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311,59791 
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383,84316 
5Y 1 65482 
612,59476 
507,40631 
103,76369 
655 11227 
0,07 
19060 
0,92 
1.12 
0131 
10,3Y 
0118 
0,38 
0134 
8e98 
1109 
’ Ot96 
0142 
3,02 
0+65 
1 e21 
Oe16 
0,9287 
0,0010 
0 35BO 
0,3451 
0.7373 
0,0081 
016814 
0,6k51 
0,7121 
0,0121 
0,31BS 
0,4001 
0 6622 
0,1101 
0 4376 
0131kl 
0,854s I 
Alert Level 
SOURCE F T A I L  
PROPABILITY 
SUH OF DEGREES OF WEAN 
SOUARES FRtEBClH SRUARE 
WEAN 
1 ERROR 
1390,63114 1 1390,63114 
228 2 3 0 5  1 1 20,74728 
6?103 0 0000 
613141383 2 306,70692 
525,03206 22 23,96509 
TYPE 
2 ERROR 
12,115 0 IOOO? 
Event Types 
SUW OF DEGREES OF HEAN F TA TL 
SQUARES FREEbOH SQUARE PROBAPILITY 
WEAN 
1 ERROR 
50141 55Y 95 1 5014,55895 131,02 06 0000 
120,99793 11 38 6 27254 
TYPE 
2 ERROR 
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Advisory Events 
SUM OF btGRkES OF MEAN 
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1 ERROR 
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2 EKHOR 
Caution Events 
SUH OF DEGREES OF tlEAN 
SUUARES FREEtlOh SQUARE 
F T A I L  
PROPABILITY 
SOURCE 
79,lO 0 I0000 HEAN 
1 ERROR 
337,08960 1 337,08960 
15,87879 11 4,25171 
TYPE 
2 ERROR 
7,90875 2 3,95437 
72,30838 22 3,28579 
1120 013193 
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Completion Time 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
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DIS 
2 ERROR 
CON 
3 ERROR 
I C  
4 ERROR 
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5 ERROR 
DP 
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C P  
7 ERROR 
DCP 
8 ERROR 
REP 
9 ERROR 
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CR 
11 ERROR 
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12 ERROR 
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170?0, 53678 
2 
22 
59 
Alert Level 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
T Y P E  
2 ERROR 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
T Y P E  
2 ERROR 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
T Y P E  
2 ERROR 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
T Y P E  
2 ERROR 
F TAIL SUfl OF D E G R E E S  OF HEAN 
SOUARE P R O B A P I L I  TY S Q U A R E S  FKEEBOH 
43573.57025 1 435?3,57025 157632 0 10000 
3043,63182 11 275,96653 
561 195046 6124 0 I 0071 1123,90092 I -7
1979 I 76556 22 89.99939 
Event Types 
SUH OF D E G R E E S  OF HEAN 
S Q U A R E S  FREEDOH SQUARE 
837671 56351 1 n 3 7 ~ 7 a m  
2754 I 86460 11 250 e 44224 
14084 i 75040 3 1750,59330 
15427,93300 88 175 31742 
Advisory Events 
SUfl OF D E G R E E S  OF HEAN 
SQUARES F R E E D O H  SRUARE 
31171161565 1 31171i61565 
1959*12870 11 178,10261 
6016,46609 4 1704 I 11672 
5156115555 44  117.23081 
Caution Events 
SUH OF DEGREES OF HEAN 
S O U A R E S  F R E E D O H  S Q U A R E  
367?91?1120 1 36729 ,21120 
2550 02686 1 1 232,7371 
3100,05540 2 1550102770 
70/1 e 37160 22 321 141’598 
F T A I L  
P E O B A B I L I T Y  
334148 0 10000 
F T A I L  
P R O P A B I L I T Y  
1?510? 0 10000 
14154 0 10000 
F T A I L  
P R O B A B I L I T Y  
157,32 0 10000 
4102 01018;J 
Discrete Actions 
Primary Vari ab1 e s 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
ERROR 
D I S  
ERROR 
CON 
ERROR 
DC 
ERROR 
PRO 
ERNOR 
DP 
ERROR 
CP 
ERROR 
DCP 
ERROR 
REP 
ERROR 
DR 
ERROR 
CR 
ERROR 
DCR 
ERROR 
PR 
ERROR 
DPR 
ERROR 
CPR 
ERROR 
SUH OF DEGREES OF 
SQUARES 
5890 , 56250 
130,93750 
1,56250 
85 1 02083 
3,57292 
72, 67708 
8,09375 
170157292 
68 06250 
58,10417 
11,67361 
57, 74306 
37,07292 
165,01042 
8 , 27431 
77,55903 
10,02778 
204,37222 
9 6 00000 
50 e 75000 
0 60764 
207 , 89236 
11 , 32292 
151,2708 
0 + 02?78 
25,97222 
12 + 25000 
83 66667 
3,06597 
125 1 43403 
FREEDOH 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
2 
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
2 
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
7 
L 
22 
2 
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
HEAN 
SQUARE 
5890,56250 
11,90341 
1,56250 
7 t 7291 7 
1,78646 
3 e 30350 
4,04688 
7 75331 
68 e 06250 
5 28220 
11 67361 
5,24Y37 
18,55646 
7 50047 
4,13715 
3,52541 
10,02778 
18,63384 
9 , 00000 
4.61364 
0 0 30382 
9 44965 
5,66146 
b 88305 
0,02778 
2,36111 
12 , 25000 
7,60506 
1.53299 
5 6 70155 
F 
494 , 06 
0,20 
0,54 
0,52 
1218Y 
2,22  
2,47 
1t17 
0154 
1195 
0603 
0682 
0,01 
1161 
0,?7 
T A I L  
PROBABILITY 
0 IO000 
0.6617 
0 e 5898 
0,6605 
0,0042 
0,1640 
0,1076 
0 3279 
r 0,4785 
0 1 1900 
0 9684 
0 6 4524 
0,9156 
0+2306 
0.7667 
61 
DCPR 
16 ERROR 
22,07292 
116,01042 
2 
?? 
LL 
11,03646 
5 , 27320 
2109 
0,14 
le98 
1s19 
?e43 
0 1472 
0,7154 
0, in73 
0 3242 
0,1113 
EVE 
17 ERROR 
1 100000 
78 + 58333 
1 
11 
1 00000 
7,14394 
DE 
18 ERROR 
15 6 00000 
89 , 00000 
1 
11 
16 6 00000 
8,09091 
CE 
19 ERROR 
I513?29? 
142,09375 
7 66146 
6145881 
DCE 
20 ERROR 
21 126042 
95,23958 
2 10153021 
4,37153 
PE 
21 ERROR 
4 00000 
104,08333 
1 
11 
0,42 
1,84 
2148 
1953 
6,94 
1,76 
0167 
3,26 
0001 
0,?4 
0#?2 
1829 
0 5289 
0,2027 
0,1070 
0 2380 
0,0232 
0,2113 
0 5239 
0 , 0577 
0 9295 
o , 633n 
0 I 8038 
0 2950 
DPE 
22 ERROR 
12 25000 
73,41667 
1 
11 
12 25000 
6,67424 
CPE 
23 ERROR 
27.19792 
120,71875 
13,59896 
5,413722 
DCPE 
24 ERROR 
14 84375 
106,48958 
2 
22 
7 e 42187 
4 * 84044 
RE 
25 ERROR 
45,56250 
72,18750 
1 
11 
45,56250 
6 * 56250 
DRE 
26 ERROR 
10,56250 
65 I 93750 
10,56250 
5 99432 
1 
1 1  
CRE 
27 ERROR 
11 ,38542 
188 11 458 
2 
22 
5 69271 
8.55066 
I 
DCHE 
28 ERROR 
55 90625 
188 t 84375 
27195313 
8,58381 
2 
22 
PRE 
29 ERROR 
0 , 06250 
83,85417 
1 
11 
0 06250 
7 6231 1 
DPRE 
30 ERROR 
1 * 56250 
71,60417 
1 
11 
1,56250 
6,50947 
CPRE 
31 ERROR 
3 96875 
197 + 86458 
2 
22 
1,98438 
8 , 99384 
DCPRE 
32 ERROR 
15,03125 
128 05208 
2 
?? 
LL 
7 51 563 
5 82055 
i 62 
1 
Alert Level 
SOURCE 
flEAN 
1 ERROR 
TYPE 
2 ERROR 
SUH OF DEGREES OF HEAN 
SQUARES FREEDOH SQUARE 
F T A I L  
PROBAP I L  I TY 
434,49317 1 434,49317 
24,01495 1 1  2,18318 
199 a02 0. oooo 
17,18549 2 8 I59324 
9,49742 22 0.43170 
19t91 0 , 0000 
Event Types 
F TAIL  
F FiGEbfi!LITl 
SCULSE 
310,Gj 0 GOO0 
!4*8? 0 IO600 
Advisory Events 
SOURCE SUH OF DEGREES OF HEAN F 
SQUARES FREEDOH SOUARE 
T A I L  
PROPAP I L  I TY 
0 * 0000 
0 10000 
TAIL 
PROBABILITY 
0 , 0000 
0 I0002 
MEAN 
1 ERROR 
488,47355 I 480 e 47355 149,82 
15,85334 11 3 1 26030 
16,54822 17,96 
0,92458 
TYPE 
2 ERROR 
55,19286 4 
40,58601 44 
Caution Events 
F 
4,08 
3,3? 
SUH OF DEGREES OF 
SQUARES FREEIIOH 
HEAN 
SQUARE 
557 13835 3 
1.64830 
49,00342 
3,56513 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
5J7 , 13835 1 
18,1312? 11 
98,00584 2 
80,55479 22 
TYPE 
2 ERROR 
63 
Heading RMS Error 
Primary Variables 
SOURCE SUH OF DEGREES OF 
flEAN 
1 ERROR 
D I S  
2 ERROR 
CON 
3 ERROR 
DC 
4 ERROR 
PRO 
5 ERROR 
DP 
5 ERROR 
CP 
7 ERROR 
DCP 
8 ERROR 
REP 
9 ERROR 
DR 
10 ERROR 
CR 
11 ERROR 
DCR 
12 ERROR 
PR 
13 ERROR 
DPR 
14 ERROR 
CPR 
15 ERROR 
SQUARES 
796 , 58006 
S t 69995 
1,41115 
2,03046 
0 + 26546 
3,30971 
0 I 35406 
5,53901 
0,31313 
4,18331 
0 I 39533 
1 I A5795 
0 45728 
7,56037 
0,53432 
4 10321 
0,08483 
21 42197 
2,02232 
3 65253 
2 ,25065 
3 74075 
0,15148 
4 8 x 9  
0,37976 
2 I 76430 
0 00029 
1,63559 
0,37671 
7,85362 
FREEDOH 
1 
11 
1 
1 1  
2 
22 
2 
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
2 
22 
1 
11 
1 
1 1  
2 
22 
2 
2 2 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
HEAN 
SQUARE 
796158006 
0151818 
1*41115 
0,18459 
0,13273 
0,15044 
0 , 17703 
0,29723 
0.31313 
0,38030 
0 39533 
0,15163 
0 * 22864 
0,34820 
0,31716 
0,18551 
0,08483 
0,22072 
2 , 02232 
0,33205 
1 e 12532 
0,17003 
0 e 07574 
0,21960 
0 37976 
0,25130 
0*00029 
0,14869 
0,18835 
0 e 35698 
F 
1537,27 
7164 
0888 
0060 
0182 
2,61 
0166 
1b70 
0838 
6.09 
6862 
0,34 
1651 
0100 
0.53 
T A I L  
PROBABIL I T Y  
0 IO000 
0,0184 
0 , 4280 
0 5599 
0 3836 
0,1347 
0 5285 
0 2057 
0,5479 
010312 
010056 
0,7121 
0 2446 
0 9655 
0 6 5973 
DCPR 
16 ERROR 
1,26901 
3,89158 
0 , 63451 
01 17689 
3.59 0 e 0448 
3,38 0 0929 
1 e40 0,2615 
1115 0 I 3356 
1131 0,2906 
L 
22 
EWE 
17 ERROR 
0, 89855 
2 , 92009 
1 
11 
0 I89855 
0,26546 
0 45282 
3 , 55501 
0 45282 
0 32318 
DE 
18 ERROR 
1 
11 
CE 
19 ERROR 
0156185 
5,38349 
2 
22 
0,28092 
0,24470 
0.37178 
3,12534 
,I i 
77 
LL 
0,18589 
0,14211 
DCE 
20 ERROR 
FE 
21 ERRUR 
0114919 
3 I 07379 
1 
11 
0,14919 
0,27944 
0,53 0 4802 
4,33 010615 
1134 0,2826 
0163 0 5400 
5.42 0 A401 
0e04 0,8519 
0145 0 6403 
4173 0,0195 
6,26 0 , 0294 
0101 0 t 9270 
0,84 014456 
1112 0 I 3455 
DPE 
22 ERROR 
0 6  78988 
2, 00484 
1 
11 
0 + 78988 
0,18226 
0,19854 
1 t A3074 
2 
22 
0 109927 
0,07412 
CPE 
23 ERROR 
DCPE 
24 ERROR 
0,19560 
51 39498 
2 
22 
01OY78r) 
0,15432 
RE 
25 ERROR 
1 06004 
2.15298 
1 
11 
1 06004 
0,19573 
DRE 
25 ERROR 
0 e 00439 
1 t 32193 
1 
11 
0 100439 
0,12018 
CRE 
27 ERROR 
0,18763 
4 , 53682 
2 
22 
0 09381 
0,20622 
2 , 17994 
5 , 06783 
2 
22 
1.08Y91 
0 , 23036 
DCRE 
28 ERROR 
PRE 
29 ERROR 
1 1 24044 
2a17YO2 
1 
11 
DPRE 
30 ERROR 
0,00184 
2,30648 
1 
11 
0 ,00184 
0120968 
2 
22 
0,17500 
0 t 20862 
CPRE 
31 ERROR 
0 9 35000 
4 I58972 
DCPRE 
32 ERROR 
0,45619 
4 , 49793 
2 
22 
0 I22810 
0 , 20445 
65 
Alert Level 
SOURCE 
flEAN 
1 ERROR 
T Y P E  
2 ERROR 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
T Y P E  
2 ERROR 
sun O F  D E G R E E S  O F  flEAN 
SQUARES F R t E l ) O H  SQUARE 
43 50941 1 43,50941 
0,503!1 11 0,04579 
0.37985 2 0 t 18993 
1,40905 22 0,06405 
Event Types 
SUti DF D E G R E E S  O F  HEAN 
SQUARES f REEDOH SQUARE 
128,57039 1 128 67039 
1137403 11 0,12491 
0,40295 8 0 * 05037 
3181114 88 0,04331 
F T A I L  
PROPAP I L I T Y  
950115 0 IO000 
2,97 0,0724 
F T A I L  
P R O P O E I L I T Y  
lOJOiO9 0 10000 
1,16 0 3306 
I 
66 
I 
Vertical Speed RMS Error 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
ERROR 
D I S  
ERROR 
CON 
ERROR 
DC 
ERROR 
PRO 
ERROR 
DP 
ERROR 
CP 
ERROR 
DCP 
ERROR 
REP 
ERROR 
DR 
ERROR 
CR 
ERROR 
DCR 
ERROR 
PR 
ERROR 
DFR 
ERROR 
CFR 
ERROR 
Primary Variables 
SUI4 OF DEGREES OF HEAN 
SQUARES 
25682,59960 
560,16745 
9,15819 
95,85491 
32,96426 
282,16402 
48,95214 
472 , 19964 
9 , 32030 
253,64652 
18,37908 
121,16724 
41,45183 
482 60437 
19 t 74835 
219 63985 
3,46425 
152 + 74725 
36 e 60754 
175 , 33650 
2,82336 
264,94908 
6,86327 
131,46242 
27 24405 
181,42972 
0 , 40481 
29,57874 
0 75415 
231,56365 
FREEBOfl 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
2 
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
2 
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
77 
LL 
2 
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
67 
SQUARE 
25602,59960 
50,92431 
91 15H19 
8 71408 
16,48213 
12,82564 
24 4 7607 
21 t 46362 
9,32030 
23,05877 
18 37908 
11 01520 
20 72592 
21,93656 
9,87418 
9,98363 
3,46425 
13 88611 
36 + 60754 
15.93968 
1,41168 
12,04309 
3,43163 
8,74829 
27.24405 
16.49352 
0 t 40481 
2 681138 
0,37708 
10,52562 
F 
504 , 33 
1.05 
1 ,29 
le14 
0,40 
1167 
0.94 
0199 
0125 
2130 
Ol12 
0+3Y 
1 e65 
0.15 
O b 0 4  
TAIL 
PROPAP I L  I TY 
0 , 0000 
0 3273 
0 , 2966 
0,3379 
0 , 5379 
0 2229 
0 e 4040 
0 t 3879 
0 t 6273 
0 t 157Y 
0 , W P  
0 + 6802 
0,2251 
0 I 7054 
0.9649 
DCPR 
16 ERROR 
EVE 
17 ERROR 
DE 
18 ERROR 
CE 
19 ERROR 
DCE 
20 ERROR 
F‘E 
21 ERROR 
DPE 
22 ERROR 
CPE 
23 ERROR 
DCPE 
24 ERROR 
RE 
25 ERROR 
DRE 
26 ERROR 
CRE 
27 ERROR 
DCRE 
28 ERROR 
PRE 
29 ERROR 
DPRE 
30 ERROR 
CPRE 
31 ERROR 
DCPRE 
32 ERROR 
12,86391 
348,25752 
135,90702 
353136541 
10 27470 
100 e 95 108 
8 I 1842.4 
131134540 
8 I 03007 
166107343 
0 a 19988 
152 0?8 18 
13,62533 
84 * 55280 
2121231 
301,72016 
36 , 33055 
273 99195 
2171288 
95,96172 
27 70706 
2 16 , ?TI76 
2.03231 
218112780 
0102933 
84 e 41 41 4 
6 , 58564 
1521 86 153 
14,68658 
158103852 
7,39940 
201 0 75530 
2 
22 
6,43195 
15 I 82989 
1 
1 1  
1 
1 1  
7 
L 
22 
7 L
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
77 
LL 
2 
77 
LL 
1 
1 1  
1 
1 1  
2 
22 
7 
L 
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
2 
22 
135190702 
32,12113 
10 + 27470 
9,17737 
4 OY 212 
5,97025 
4,01503 
7,54879 
0 t 19988 
131 82529 
13,62533 
7 e 69662 
1 e 10616 
13.71 455 
18 16528 
12,45418 
2,71288 
8,81470 
27 I 70706 
19,66161 
1,03616 
91 91490 
1 , 82934 
12,66307 
0 I 02933 
7167401 
6158S64 
13 e 89650 
7134329 
7 1 18357 
3 t 69970 
3 I 17070 
0069 
0153 
0101 
1 t77 
0*08 
1.46 
Ob31 
0100 
0147 
1 I 0 2  
0140 
016710 
0,0642 
0,3127 
015143 
0 5949 
0 9065 
0,2103 
O I 92?& 
0,2542 
0 55’02 
0 2602 
0,9012 
0 e 8663 
019518 
0 , 5055 
0,3763 
0 6729 
Alert Level 
sun OF DEGREES OF HEAN 
SllUARES FREEliOM S N A R E  
F T A I L  
PROBABILITY 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
2688 , 21509 1 2688,21509 
249,09430 11 2,54494 
118t71 0 l0000 
'YPE 
~ 2 ERROR 
28.42152 2 14,21074 
60*50009 ?? 2,75000 
5617 0,0145 
Event Types 
F T A I L  
PROBABILITY 
sun OF BEGREES OF HEAN 
SQUARES FREEDOH SQUARE 
SOURCE 
1?b,18 0 IO000 5419 50022 1 5419,50022 
559,64953 11 50,97723 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
3,53 010014 195.02543 8 24 137820 
to6199455 88 6 189767 
TYPE 
2 ERROR 
Advisory Events 
SOURCE SUH OF DEGREES OF MEAN 
SQUARES FKEEBOn SRUARE 
F T A I L  
PROPAP I L I TY 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
488 , 47355 1 488 , 47355 
35,86334 11 3 26030 
149,8? 0 , 0000 
TYPE 
2 ERROR 
66 + 19286 4 16,5482 
40.6a~oi 44 0 92468 
17+90 0, 0000 
Caution Events 
SOURCE SUH OF DEGREES OF MEAN 
SOUARES FREEDOM SOUARE 
F TAIL. 
PROBAFILI TY 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
557,13835 1 567 e 13835 
18,13127 11 1 t 54830 
344608 0 8 0000 
13,37 0 ,0002 TYPE 
2 ERROR 
9~,0ota4 2 49 , 00342 
80,65479 22 3,66513 
69 
Airspeed RMS Error 
Primary Variables 
SOURCE SUI! OF DEGREES OF HEAN 
SQUARES FREEDOH SOUARE 
f T A I L  
PROBABILITY 
kEAN 
1 ERROR 
1201,83557 1 1201,83557 
74,23933 11 6 I 74903 
178,08 0 IO000 
@IS 
2 ERROR 
0,04375 1 0,04375 
8,52280 11 0,77480 
0606 0,8165 
CON 
3 ERROR 
2111318 2 1 I 05659 
7.01534 22 0,31388 
3,31 0 , 0552 
DC 
4 ERROR 
3 3,27016 L 1 I 63508 
28,35016 22 1 28844 
1 e27 0 t 3OOY 
PRO 
5 ERROR 
1 46208 1 1 , 46208 
18,32035 11 1 t71094 
0.85 0 * 3751 
DP 
6 ERROR 
0 6 021 76 1 0 I 02176 
4,55489 11 0,41408 
0105 0, 822Y 
CP 
7 ERROR 
q 0,20154 6 0+10077 
3?112351 22 1+45016 
0.07 0 9335 
DCP 
8 ERROR 
5,80568 2 2 90284 
16,07457 22 0*73066 
3,97 0,0336 
REP 
9 ERROR 
0 e 21545 1 0821545 
4,78171 11 0142470 
0,50 Ob4Y61 
DR 
10 ERROR 
7,52131 1 7,52131 
10610472 11 0,91861 
CR 
11 ERROR 
1165765 2 0,82882 
13,0232 22 0,59193 
DCR 
12 ERROR 
3 1,24452 L 0 62226 
14159665 22 0,66348 
PR 
13 EliROR 
2.93266 1 2,93266 
A,15385 11 0455944 
5,24 0 , 0428 
DPR 
14 ERROR 
1.11 0,3147 0,47266 1 0,47266 
w 3 a 6  11 0,42581 
CF'R 
15 ERROR 
7 1113164 L 0,56582 
15,07240 22 0,6851 i 
Ot83 0 * 4510 
70 
3 , 85237 
19,09899 
2 
22 
1,92619 
0,86814 
2122 
5115 
0121 
0b88 
2820 
?a38 
0t03 
0094 
1174 
0,11 
0e41 
1899 
2,43 
0,90 
2,35 
0,17 
1,69 
0,1325 
0,0444 
0 , 6554 
0,4283 
0,1342 
0,1515 
018610 
014073 
0,1988 
0 , 7454 
0 5334 
0,1602 
0,1117 
0 3631 
0,1534 
0 , 8459 
0.2081 
DCPR 
ERROR 
EVE 
ERROR 
BE 
ERROR 
CE 
ERROR 
DCE 
ERROR 
PE 
ERROR 
DPE 
ERROR 
CPE 
ERROR 
DCPE 
ERROR 
RE 
ERROR 
DRE 
ERROR 
CRE 
ERROR 
DCRE 
ERROR 
PRE 
ERROR 
DPRE 
ERROR 
CPRE 
ERROR 
DCPRE 
ERROR 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
5 * 47950 
11 71283 
1 
11 
5.47950 
1,06480 
0 20175 
10,54824 
1 
11 
0 , 201 75 
0 t 95893 
1 60775 
20,05159 
2 
22 
0 80388 
0,91203 
1,2015Y 
0,54541 
2 40319 
11 99896 
2 
22 
1;91592 
8, E5902 
1 
11 
1,91592 
0 80627 
0,01085 
3171710 
1 
11 
0,01085 
0,33792 
0 ,85599 
loa05033 
2 
22 
0 t 42799 
0.45729 
1 1 44772 
9,15190 
2 
22 
0 6 72386 
0,41600 
0 04803 
41 /6545 
1 
11 
0104803 
0 I43322 
0 , 18562 
0 44885 
0.18562 
4,93730 
1 
11 
2 1 68285 
14,81221 
2 
22 
1,34143 
0 67328 
2 t 51851 
11,42139 
2 
22 
1 e 25926 
0,51915 
0,26095 
0 + 28990 
0 26095 
3,18895 
1 
11 
1 I54795 
0 65816 
1,547Y5 
7.23980 
1 
11 
0 , 10228 
0,60637 
0 20455 
13,34022 
2 
22 
2 19987 
14,34309 
2 
22 
1 6 09993 
0,65196 
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Alert Level 
SOURCE 
KEAN 
1 ERROR 
TYPE 
2 EkROR 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
TYPE 
2 ERROR 
SUN OF DEGREES OF HEAN 
SQUARES FREEBOfl SQlJARE 
04 6 0221 1 1 94 8 0221 1 
3,29372 11 0,29943 
0,27210 2 0 + 1 Z605 
2,33355 22 0,10507 
Event Types 
SUN OF DEGREES OF HEAN 
SOUARES FEEEDOH SOUARE 
? 4 9 A  458 1 248 t 21  468 
11,34116 11 1,03101 
1 87075 8 0 t 23384 
16,54810 86 0 t 18605 
F TAIL 
PROBkBILITY 
314,OO 0 * 0000 
1 128 0 2972 
F T A I L  
FROPABILITY 
240 I 75 0 IO000 
1124 0,2837 
72 
I 
Control Activity 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
DIS 
2 ERROR 
CON 
3 ERROR 
DC 
4 ERROR 
FRO 
5 ERROR 
DP 
6 ERROR 
CP 
7 ERROR 
DCP 
8 ERROR 
REP 
9 ERROR 
DR 
10 ERROR 
CR 
11 ERROR 
DCR 
12 ERROR 
PR 
13 ERROR 
DPR 
14 ERROR 
CPR 
15 ERROR 
Primary Variables 
SUfl OF DEGREES OF flEAH 
SOUARES 
406512 + 50694 
?1028,61806 
35,00694 
2781,51806 
760 101 389 
11895 t 61 11 1 
951,26389 
4814,51111 
1101 t77778 
9439 125989 
240 t 25000 
7505 45833 
1 22 t 59722 
5591,3611 1 
75,541 67 
5755 50000 
6 25000 
2170 ,7Y 157 
152,11111 
2936,93056 
141,29167 
5245 + 1 6667 
437,59722 
5889 t 61 11 1 
82,50694 
6/6,7847? 
10,56250 
3506,89583 
179 , 18056 
2604 27778 
FREEL)Otl 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
2 
22 
1 
I1  
1 
11 
7 
L 
22 
2 
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
2 
22 
1 
11 
1 
11 
2 
22 
SQUARE 
406512,50694 
1911+69255 
35,00694 
52,87437 
380 t 00694 
540,75505 
475 63194 
?!St84596 
1201 I77778 
863,55944 
?4@+25000 
227 85985 
61,29861 
?99,60732 
37,77083 
307,05818 
6 t 25000 
197.34470 
152 e 11111 
258 81187 
70 t 64583 
238 141667 
218 79861 
257,70960 
82 150694 
61,52588 
1015630 
318,80d?l 
89 5Y 028 
118t37626 
F 
212t65 
0.14 
0170 
2617 
1 e39 
1105 
0,20  
0512 
0t03 
0e57 
0t30 
0682 
1634 
0e03 
0 676 
T A I L  
PROPAFILITY 
0 *0000 
0 t71 6Y 
0 + 5066 
011376 
0,2530 
0 e 3266 
0 , S l t : j  
0,8849 
0 e 8520 
0 e 4677 
0,7465 
0 t 4546 
012714 
0 8589 
0.4810 
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DCPR 
16 ERROR 
285 I 79167 
4333 25000 
2 
22 
142,89583 
196 96591 
0173 0 + 4953 
40,?1 0*00@1 
0,05 018194 
2113 0,1422 
0,78 0 e 4723 
EVE 
17 ERROR 
67 65,06250 
1850,47917 
6765,06250 
158,22538 
1 
11 
DE 
18 ERROR 
8 50694 
17 1 1 a 70 139 
8 t 50694 
155,60922 
1 
11 
CE 
19 ERROR 
348,29167 
1399,91567 
7 .. 
22 
174 , 14583 
91,58712 
DCE 
20 ERROR 
178,84722 
2533,94444 
2 89,42351 
115,17929 22 
PE 
21 ERROR 
23,361 11 
2091 8 09722 
1 
11 
23.3611 1 
190,09975 
0,12 0 7325 
Ob51 0 + 4894 
1,42 0,2619 
le21 0,3167 
1.93 0,1919 
1602 0 3340 
0633 0,7191 
OB84 0 4439 
2917 011690 
0,36 0,5616 
2,03 O I 1552 
1144 0 6 2573 
DPE 
22 ERROR 
90 t 25000 
1941,37500 
1 
11 
90 , 25000 
175,48864 
CPE 
23 ERROR 
553,93056 
1275,1111 1 
2 
77 
LL 
276,96528 
194 * 35869 
DCFE 
24 ERROR 
289,04167 
2623,08333 
7 
L 
22 
144,52083 
119,23106 
RE 
25 ERROR 
205,44444 
1169 18056 
1 
11 
205144444 
106,28914 
DRE 
26 ERROR 
121 * 00000 
1303 e 791 67 
1 
11 
121,00000 
118 52552 
CRE 
27 ERROR 
94,59722 
3108,77778 
? .. 
22 
47,29061 
141 1 30808 
DCRE 
28 ERROR 
187,79167 
2450,56667 
7 
L 
22 
93 189583 
11 1 39394 
PRE 
29 ERROR 
351 I 56250 
1783,97917 
351,56250 
152,17992 
1 
11 
DPRE 
30 ERROR 
52 56250 
1614,31250 
1 
11 
52,56250 
146,75560 
CPRE 
31 ERROR 
613,04167 
3322,16667 
2 
22 
306,52063 
151,00758 
DCPRE 
32 ERROR 
489 e 12500 
3724 I00000 
2 
22 
244,56250 
169,27273 
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Alert Level 
1 
2 
1 
7 
i 
1 
2 
1 
7 
L 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
ERROR 
TYPE 
ERROR 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
ERROR 
TYFE 
ERROR 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
ERROR 
TYPE 
ERROR 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
ERROR 
TYPE 
ERROR 
SUM OF DEGREES OF BEAN 
SQUARES FFEELKPl SQlJARE 
28419,77843 1 28419,77843 
1585130410 11 144 I 11855 
369 170502 2 184,85251 
242,38149 22 11,01734 
Events Types 
SUH UF UEtiirEES OF MEAN 
SQUAKLS FREEDOH SQUAkt  
Advisory Events 
SUH OF DEGREES OF hEAN 
SOUARES FHEEllOH SQUARE 
27036162211 1 27036,62211 
1515,22932 11 137 7481 2 
44.92951 2 22 146475 
541101057 22 ,751 50048 
F TAIL 
PROPAPILITY 
197120 0 IO000 
1811/6 0 10000 
F T A I L  
PROPAPI LI TY 
196,28 0 *0000 
0188 0,4,?85 
Caution Events 
F T A I L  SUh OF DEGREES OF HEAN 
SQUARES FREELiOH SQUARE FROPAPILITY 
39511 157617 1 39511,57617 151 153 0,0000 
,7589 t 00859 11 244 I45533 
1129 0 I 2869 193,31135 4 40 4 32784 
154,7195189 44 37 e 33982 
75 
Workload Rating 
SOURCE 
HEAN 
1 ERROR 
DIS 
2 ERROR 
CON 
3 ERROR 
DC 
4 ERROR 
FRO 
5 ERROR 
DP 
6 ERROR 
CP 
7 ERROR 
DCF' 
8 ERROR 
REP 
9 ERROR 
DR 
10 ERROR 
CR 
11 ERROR 
DCR 
12 ERROR 
PR 
13 ERROR 
DPR 
14 ERROR 
CFR 
15 ERROR 
DCFR 
16 ERROR 
SlJH OF DEGREES OF 
SOUARES FREEDOH 
9004 1 82000 1 
548,88667 11 
59,40500 1 
50*03500 11 
28,95083 2 
17,77250 22 
44,06083 2 
69,02917 22 
27 t 39000 1 
117,72567 1 1  
14 04500 1 
53+19500 11 
0 s 75250 2 
105,87083 22 
5164250 2 
62854750 22 
10*88889 1 
25+89111 1 1  
1,22722 1 
17,61944 11 
? 1 1 66028 L 
26,58972 22 
6 I 26028 2 
41,02306 22 
2,13556 1 
12,64444 11 
0 1 12500 1 
25,32167 11 
7 + 40194 2 
49,54806 22 
0,49083 2 
49,49250 22 
HEAN 
SaUARE 
YO09 ,82000 
49 I 89879 
5Y e 40500 
4 54864 
14,47542 
0,80784 
22,03042 
3,13769 
27 38000 
10,70242 
14,04500 
4,83591 
0,37625 
4,81231 
2,82125 
2,84307 
10 8 88889 
2,44465 
1,22722 
1,60177 
0,83014 
1 20862 
3,13014 
1 86468 
2.13556 
1, 14949 
0,12500 
2,30197 
3,70097 
2,25218 
0,24542 
2,24966 
TAIL 
PROBABILITY 
0 e 0000 
010041 
0,0000 
0 t 0044 
0,1380 
0,1164 
0 9250 
0,3867 
0,0585 
0,4001 
0,5136 
0 2097 
0*2001 
0 8200 
0,2162 
0,8971 
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